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VALID EXISTING RIGHTS AND THE
CONSTITUTION: 1983 REGULATORY CHANGES
JoHN McFERRiN*
BENITA Y. WITMAN**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977' (the Act or SMCRA)
is a study in legislative compromise. Disputed and debated for over six years before
passage,' the Act attempts to balance a societal interest in reducing environmental
damage caused by surface mining 3 of coal and a private coal industry interest in
production of coal by surface mining techniques. Its stated purposes are a mix
4
of coal production and environmental protection values.
The balancing of interests is nowhere more clear than in the sections of the
Act designating lands unsuitable for mining. The Act expressly prohibits mining
within three hundred feet of an occupied dwelling, certain public buildings, schools,
churches, or public parks.' It prohibits mining within one hundred feet of a cemetery
or a public road. 6 There are also prohibitions upon mining in specified federal lands,
such as national parks, recreation areas, or in historic sites." In addition to these
per se prohibitions, other lands may be deleted from allowable areas for surface
mining by designation of unsuitability for mining.8
None of these prohibitions are absolute. These limitations do not apply to operations which existed on the date the Act became effective. 9 In addition, these per
se limitations are "subject to valid existing rights.""0 While this new1 term is the
statutory standard, the Act itself does not define it. Congress left it to the Office
of Surface Mining (OSM) of the Department of the Interior to define this term
by regulation. During the time since the Act became law, the regulatory definition
* Staff Attorney, Appalachian Research and Defense Fund, Charleston, W. Va.; B.A. University
of Kentucky, 1976; J.D. Duke University, 1976.
** B.A. West Virginia University, 1981; J.D. West Virginia University, 1985.
30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
2 For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see Note, A Summary of the Legislative
History of the Surface Mining Control and ReclamationAct of 1977 and the Relevant Legal Periodical
Literature, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 775 (1979).
The Act also regulates the surface effects of underground mining. See 30 U.S.C. § 1266 (1982).
4 30 U.S.C. § 1202 (1982).
5 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5) (1982).
6 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4)-(5) (1982).
7 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1)-(2) (1982).
- 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a) (1982).

9 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1982).
Ild.

The term "valid existing rights" had been used in other contexts. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 463
(1982) (Indian Reorganization Act), 43 U.S.C. § 1613(g) (1980) (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act).
In the final rulemaking under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, the Secretary of the
Interior did not rely upon meanings of "valid existing rights" established in other contexts. 44 Fed.
Reg. 14,993 (1979).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1985

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

of "valid existing rights" has been the subject of two rulemakings' 2 and two court
challenges.'

3

This Article examines the current definition and discusses problems

which may result in attempting to apply that definition.
II.

HIsToRY OF THE VALID

ExisTING

RIGHTS DEFINITION

Soon after the Act was effective, the Office of Surface Mining of the United
States Department of the Interior began defining valid existing rights by regulation. After publishing a proposed regulation and receiving public comment, the
agency defined valid existing rights, except for haul roads, as "property rights created
by a legally binding conveyance, lease, deed, contract, or other document authorizing the applicant to use surface mining techniques to produce coal". ' The property right had to be in existence by August 3, 1977.'1 To qualify as holding valid
existing rights, the applicant had to have all necessary federal or state permits by
August 3, 1977, or demonstrate that the coal was needed for an immediately adjacent ongoing surface mining operation for which permits were obtained before
August 3, 1977.16 The regulations explicitly stated that a mere expectation of a
right to mine coal is not the equivalent of valid existing rights., 7 The documents
serving as the basis of the property right underlying valid existing rights were to
be interpreted by custom and usage at the time and place where the document came
into existence."I The applicant must show that the parties to the document, in fact,
contemplated a right to conduct the coal mining operations necessitating the
exemption as valid existing rights."

Within the statutory2' sixty day comment period from publication of the regulations, various interests filed nine complaints raising approximately one hundred
challenges to the regulations. Included were challenges to the valid existing rights
regulations. 2 '
Citizens concerned about potential environmental damage challenged as overbroad the provision to allow surface coal mining when needed by adjacent existing
operations. Judge Flannery found the regulations to be a rational method to allow
22
mining in circumstances that otherwise would be an unconstitutional taking.

12 44 Fed. Reg. 15,342 (1979) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1984)); 48 Fed. Reg. 41,348 (1983)
(codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1984)).
11-In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1084 (D.D.C.
1980); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig. II, No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. filed 1984).
" 44 Fed. Reg. 15,342 (1979) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(a) (1984)).

13Id.
6 Id.
1 Id.
Is Id.
"Id.
20 30
2,In
22

U.S.C. § 1276(a) (1982).
re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1084.

Id. at 1091-92.
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The National Coal Association raised three challenges. First, it argued that
state law should be used to interpret valid existing rights. OSM agreed to incorporate in the regulations state law interpretation of documents as an alternative
to "custom and usage." Second, it objected to the requirement that all permits
to mine coal be obtained before August 3, 1977, in order to qualify as valid existing
rights. The Association argued that the "all permits" requirement was unfair because
expeditious issuance of permits is beyond the coal operator's control. An operator
making a good faith effort to obtain all necessary permits should not be penalized
for bureaucratic delay.23 Judge Flannery agreed. The Court remanded 30 C.F.R.
§ 761.5(a)(2)(i) to the Secretary for incorporation of the good faith effort to obtain
all permits by August 3, 1977.2 '

Finally, the Association challenged the definition of valid existing rights as an
unconstitutional taking of property. The Association argued that a person owning
property or owning the right to mine property "may be deprived of his reasonable
use and expectation of mining because he fails to meet the strictures of the regulatory
definition." 25 The Secretary argued that advancement of public health and safety
by SMCRA necessitates a narrow construction of a taking.2 6 While finding the
Secretary's argument persuasive, the Court declared the Coal Association's challenge
judgment until presented with a specific claim rather than
hypothetical and reserved
27
challenge.
a facial
Two subsequent challenges to section 522(e) of the Act were, in effect, sidestepped by the United States Supreme Court.28 Each case presented a facial challenge
to section 522(e) rather than a concrete controversy over application of the Act
to specific property interests. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc., the Court upheld section 522(e) on its face because it merely
regulates conditions under which operations may be conducted. The section does
not prohibit alternative uses of the land; thus it does not deny an owner all
economically viable uses of his land.29 The taking question was considered not ripe
because the appellees had not pursued administrative relief with regard to their
individual property interests. The finding that the "mere enactment" of the Act
does not effect a taking does not prevent coal mine operators from challenging
as a "taking" application of section 522(e) to their specific property.3" The Court
only commented on the federal regulations in a footnote and then only about the
"all permits" test. While noting that the regulation had been remanded to the
Secretary, the Court made an unclarified general statement that the "all permits"
23 Id. at 1091.
14

Id. at 1090, 1110.

25 Id. at 1090.
26 Id. at 1091.
27

Id.

" Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Hodel v.

Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
29
'o

Id. at 294-95.
Id. at 296.
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test was not compelled by the Act or the legislative history.3 ' Until the September
1983 revised regulations were promulgated, the Secretary essentially applied the
existing regulations with the good faith effort changes in the "all permits" section."
After a change in Administration in 1981, the Secretary announced his intention to amend many sections of the regulations on surface mining. The Secretary's
stated purpose was to extend greaterflexibility to the states to meet particular state
circumstances 33 and to operate more efficiently. 34 Among the changes was a proposed change in the definition of valid existing rights. 3
The Secretary's announced reason for this change in the definition of valid
existing rights was a desire to be consistent with the ruling of Judge Flannery in
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation.36 This decision was cited
as the basis for the failure of the original definition on judicial review. 37 While
it is true that the definition was found lacking on judicial review, the decision only
proposed a modification in the "all permits" test to include a good faith effort
to obtain all necessary permits. In this way, those who had applied would not be
penalized for bureaucratic delay, something which is beyond their control. Contrary to the Secretary's broad characterization of Judge Flannery's decision as
requiring a complete revision of the valid existing rights definition," the regulation
was remanded solely to make revisions in accordance with the enunciated
modification. 39 Judge Flannery specifically did not rule on the overall taking
question.
Two proposed changes were relatively noncontroversial. The language explaining the needed adjacent area exemption allowing surface coal mining in prohibited
areas was expanded to include situations where the "extension of mining is essen40
tial to make the surface coal mining operation as a whole economically viable."
The change was perceived to be in line with Judge Flannery's opinion in In re
PermanentSurface Mining Regulation Litigation and not significantly affecting the
existing balance of interests."' The revised regulations also formally adopted Judge
Flannery's order that state law as well as custom and usage be used to interpret
3 1 Id.
32

3 E. MIN. L. INST. 7-20, 7-21 (1980).

1148 Fed. Reg. 41,312 (1983).
34Id.
31Id. at 41,313 (1983) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5).
36 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1084.
" 48 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1983) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5).
38Id.
11 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1091.
40

30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1984).

4' OFFICE OF SURFACE MIno RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR;
PROPOSED REVISIONS TO TIE PERMANENT PROGRAM REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING SECTION 501(B) OF THE
SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977, VOL. II COMMENTS, 135 (January 1983)
[hereinafter cited as PROPOSED REviSIONS].
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documents and contracts to determine what property rights or interests a producer
possesses.42
The radical change came in the definition of valid existing rights. The Secretary
proposed alternatives including exercising good faith prior to August 3, 1977, (similar
to the first regulation as interpreted by Judge Flannery) and defining valid existing
rights, as coal ownership alone. After extensive public comment,43 the Secretary
adopted the following regulation:
(a) Except for haul roads, that a person possesses valid existing rights for an area
protected under section 522(e) of the Act on August 3, 1977, if the application
of any of the prohibitions contained in that section to the property interest that
existed on that date would effect a taking of a person's property which would entitle
the person to just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution."'
These regulations are also the subject of a judicial challenge. Within the sixty
day time limit,4" a consortium of citizens' groups filed an action for review of these
regulations with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. This
issue has recently been ruled on by the court.46
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGES IN THE

DEFINITION OF VALID EXISTING RIGHTS

The dramatic change in the revised regulations is the shift in the valid existing
rights definition from a mechanical test to a constitutional one. Under the previous
regulation, an administrator could mechanically apply the "all permits" test. Under
the revised regulations, the administrator must apply a constitutional taking analysis
to valid existing rights determinations. This has significant implications both for
the ease of program administration and the amount of land which the new definition may open for surface mining.

42

30 C.F.R. § 761.5 (1984).

11The public comments are compiled in PROPOSED REVISIONS, supra note 41. In summary, the
environmental interests argued that valid existing rights should be narrowly construed. The industry
representatives maintained that the Office of Surface Mining should adopt the most liberal definition
possible. They pointed out that the expanding of mining allowed under a more liberal definition of
valid existing rights might not come about because of other restrictions in the Act, such as limits on
blasting. There was also some dispute over the amount of land that would be affected by the proposed
change. Environmental interests, citing the Environmental Impact Statement prepared in connection
with the promulgation, contended that 1.2 million acres would be opened up for surface mining. Industry commenters contended that only 285,000 acres would be affected.
14 48 Fed. Reg. 41,439 (1983) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.5).
" 30 U.S.C. 1276(a)(1) (1982).
46 In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulations Litig. II, No. 79-1144. On March 22, 1985, the
court ruled that the federal regulation defining valid existing rights had been promulgated in a procedurally incorrect manner and remanded the regulation to the federal Office of Surface Mining. In so
ruling, the court noted that it had not reached the merits of the regulation.
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Constitutional Theory and Its Application to Valid Existing Rights

The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that all governmental regulation has an economic impact. 7 It is inevitable that some class of persons will be hurt by a regulation; others will be helped. While the impact upon
various property owners varies, governmental action does have an impact upon
the value of property. The Court has also conceded the impossibility of governing
where the government was required to make each person whole when some governmental action resulted in diminution of the value of that person's property. 4
The Court has repeatedly tried to build some theoretical framework so as to
resolve the tension between private property rights and the necessity of some governmental regulation. Such a result has been based upon the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. As this body of law has developed, it
has produced some varying (and at times overlapping) tests for determining when
a "taking" that requires just compensation has occurred. The manner in which
the various tests are applied, and which test is applied, could lead to varying results
in any analysis of whether a company had valid existing rights under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
1.

"Noxious Use" Test

The first test to be developed was a "noxious use" test. Such a test required
a finding by a legislative body that a particular use of property was offensive and
should, as a matter of public policy, be prohibited. Once this finding was made,
and the finding had survived judicial scrutiny of whether it is an "unreasonable
and arbitrary exercise" of authority,4 9 such a use could be prohibited without paying compensation to persons whose property was destroyed 0 because of the
regulation.
An early example of this "noxious use" theory is Mugler v. Kansas." In that

" See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
" Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 177 (1915).
11The United States Supreme Court suggested for purposes of constitutional taking analysis there
"

is no difference between an appropriation for public use and a destruction of property. See United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 384 (1945). But cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 265-66 (1946). The Supreme Court has not emphasized this distinction in recent cases involving
regulations challenged as takings of property without compensation. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). In a 1983
article, Professor Freilich suggests that this is an important distinction and a key to understanding
"taking" jurisprudence. It is Professor Freilich's thesis that an appropriation of property for public
use should be considered as an instance of eminent domain and compensated accordingly. Instances

of destruction or diminution invalue without any appropriation for use should be subjected to "substantive
due process analysis" and declared void if they fail to meet that test. Freilich, Solving the "Taking"
Equation: Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 15 URa. LAW 447 (1983).
" Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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case, Kansas passed a statute prohibiting the brewing of beer except in some very
limited circumstances. The petitioner had owned a brewery at the time the statute
was passed. In spite of this brewery being rendered very nearly worthless by the
passage of the statute, the Court held that there was no taking. The Court seemed
to equate taking without due process of law with a taking for public use without
just compensation. The Court said, in effect, that so long as the statute was to
protect such things as public health, morals, safety, and welfare, then it did not
take without due process of law. If it did not take without due process of law
then, according to the Court, it was not a taking without just compensation. So
long as the police power was not exercised arbitrarily, its exercise apparently did
not require the payment of compensation.
The Court took a similar approach in Hadacheck v. Sebastian.2 There the
plaintiff owned a brickyard which had been located outside the city. The city annexed
the area where the yard was located and passed an ordinance prohibiting brick
making in a designated area. The brickyard was in the designated area. The Court
ruled that this was not a taking without compensation. This was in spite of evidence
that the land where the yard was located was worth $800,000 as a brickyard but
only $60,000 for any other use. In so holding, the Court said:
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential powers
of government, one that is least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exer-

cise, usually on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence
precludes any limitation upon it when not exercised arbitrarily. 3
If one applies such a "noxious use" test to determine whether some person
has valid existing rights under the surface mining statute"4 and regulations,"5 one
56
finds that, in all likelihood, no one has valid existing rights. Both the federa
and the West Virginia" statutes contain strong prefatory language on the evils of
uncontrolled surface mining. Both statutes contain prohibitions upon mining in
the national forest and within certain distances of roads, homes, and public
buildings.' 8 In light of the record before Congress on the problems which mining
could and did cause, 59 one would be hard pressed to argue that the prohibition
in certain limited locations was arbitrary.
"

Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).

"

Id. at 410.

§ 1272 (1982);
30 C.F.R. § 761.5; West
Natural Resources, Chapter 20-6,
regulatory definition, see 48 Fed.
5 30 U.S.C.
"

86
"
"

W. VA. CODE § 20-6-22 (1984).
Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Regulations, Department of
Series VII § 2.119 (1983). For recent amendments to the federal
Reg. 41,312 (1983).

30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
W. VA. CODE § 20-6-2 (1981).
30 U.S.C. § 1272; W. VA. CODE § 20-6-22 (1984).

"Regulation of Surface Mining: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Environment and Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) (hearings on April 9, 10, 16 and 17 and on May 14 and 15). Especially interesting are
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Current regulations defined valid existing rights,6" in essence, as whatever rights
an owner must be allowed to exercise so as to prevent application of the limitations
on locations of mines from resulting in an unconstitutional taking of that person's
property.6 If the reach of the police power is as unfettered as the cases discussed
above seem to indicate, then there are no such rights. Congress and the West Virginia
Legislature have, in effect, declared that surface mining is, in certain locations,
a "noxious use" of land. Such a declaration makes prohibition of mining in that
location acceptable even without compensation.
2.

"Some Remaining Use" Test

While the Court continued to apply the "noxious use" theory until at least
the 1960s,"2 the Court softened the absolute of the "noxious use" theory and began
use of a balancing approach with PennsylvaniaCoal Co. v. Mahon"3 in 1922. There
a Pennsylvania statute required underground coal mining to be conducted in such
a way as to not cause subsidence to public buildings, roads, stores, or private
occupied buildings. Even though the mining company had acquired the right to
mine all of the coal beneath the Mahon property before the statute became effective, the Mahons sought to use this statute to prevent mining of the coal beneath
their property.
Although the Court could have applied the "noxious use" theory and upheld
the validity of the statute,6 ' it did not. Instead it introduced for the first time the
overt 65 use of a continuum. This continuum recognized that any regulation has
some impact on the value of property. At one end of the continuum are instances
where the impact upon the value of the property affected is relatively small. Here
there would be no taking. At the other end of the continuum are instances where
the impact of the regulation is so dramatic that it amounts to complete destruction.
In such a case there would be a taking.
Although the Court did not give any guidance for locating the point on that
continuum where taking began, it did indicate that somewhere along that line one
passed from regulation66 to taking. 6 "The general rule at least is that while property

pages 775-96. See also, Act of July 21, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 1977 U.S.
595-99.
60 48 Fed. Reg. 41,312 (1983).
Id. at 41,349 (1983) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 761).
'z Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
63

CODE CONa.

& AD. NEWS,

Mahon, 260 U.S. 393.

6, It

certainly would have been a legitimate finding that mining of coal in such a way as to cause
collapse of the surface and resulting damage to the overlying land is a "noxious use" of that property.
6' The Court apparently had done some balancing seven years earlier in Hadacheck, but had
not articulated this balancing or used a continuum as a basis for its decision.
66Presumably this would require no compensation in spite of the regulation's effect upon the
value of property rights.
6, Justice Holmes' use of the term "taking" had led subsequent courts to assume
that this con-
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may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized

as a taking." 68 Having confused69 the law of "takings" by establishing this stan70
dard, Justice Holmes left it to later courts to determine what this standard meant.

In making a constitutionally based determination of valid existing rights under

this theory, a regulatory authority could come to varying results depending upon
that particular authority's application of the test. One reasonable application of

the test would result in finding that no one (or almost no one) has valid existing
rights. As later refined, 7 1 the test under this theory of constitutional taking would

be whether there remains any use of the property which can be made after the
application of the statute to it. With coal mining (particularly where the mining

company owned both surface and minerals) there would always (or almost always)
be some other use for the land even where the statutory distance limits prohibit

mining. In most situations the land would have some value as agricultural, pasture,
or forest land if for no other use. It is, of course, true that these uses would be

much less valuable monetarily than would use of the land for mining.7" But such
a reduction in value is not dispositive."1 So long as there remains some beneficial
use of the land, there is no taking. Under this theory, only an absolute destruction
74
of property is a taking which requires compensation.
While this "no other use" test for resolving taking questions would appear

simple enough, it is not always so. It first presents the problem of determining
how substantial a remaining use must be to prevent a prohibition of coal mining
templated some payment of compensation when a taking was found. In Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412, no
compensation was sought and none awarded. Professor Freilich suggests that this confusion over remedy
reflects a confusion in the analysis frequently given to cases where a regulation is challenged as an
unconstitutional taking of property. Freilich, supra note 50.
', Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
60 The actual holding is much more limited than the proposition for which Mahon is cited in
cases such as Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (1978). As Professor McGinley and Mr. Barrett correctly
point out, the facts in Mahon involved adjustment of private rights between individuals. It did not
involve the relationship of the state to an individual. The regulation failed not, as the oft-quoted language
implies, because a regulation went too far. It failed because there was no public interest to be advanced.
McGinley & Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon Revisited: Is the FederalSurface Mining Act
a Valid Exercise of the Police Power or an Unconstitutional Taking?, 16 TULSA L. J. 418 (1981).
70 While Mahon, has long been assumed to be the cornerstone of "taking" jurisprudence and
Justice Holmes' dictum as the standard for determining when a taking has occurred, the authors would
suggest otherwise. While this standard may be useful in analyzing public interferences with relations
between private individuals, it is unsatisfactory as a limit of public control on private use. For a nearly
contemporaneous example of court sanctioned destruction of private property upon a finding that the
public interest would be served, see Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
7' Andrus, 444 U.S. 51; Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264.
72 In some situations this may be true only in the short term. With obligations to treat discharges
from acid seams continuing long after the mine is closed, the most economic use of the land might
be forestry, agriculture, or some other nonmining use. Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1983).
" See, e.g., Andrus, 444 U.S. 51.
, See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104; Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349
(1908).
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from being an unconstitutional taking. While there may be instances in which the
remaining use will be clear, there will inevitably be instances where the remaining
use is so insubstantial that it essentially amounts to no residual use at all." Results
of determinations could be chaotic. Some regulatory authorities might conclude
that the remaining use had to be comparable in monetary value to the monetary
value that coal mining would have. 76 Others might conclude that any legally protecdible use of the land 77 would be sufficient to prevent application of the distance
limits of the Surface Mining Act from being an unconstitutional taking. While the
Supreme Court cases point toward the latter as the more nearly correct approach,"
the standard is vague enough to justify a wide range of applications of the standard to particular situations.
Perhaps more troublesome in applying this test to a valid existing rights determination is the practice of severing the mineral rights from the surface estate. If
the mineral owner held only the mineral rights and could not mine the coal, then
there is no alternative use which can be made of the only property held at that
location. In its latest discussion on that point, the Supreme Court has indicated
that it will not give constitutional protection to fragmented interests. In Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 7 9 the owner of a building sought to put
a substantial addition on top of it. A local ordinance required approval for such
an addition and the company could not win such approval. The landowner contended that this was a taking of its property without compensation. As part of
its argument, the company asserted that one part of its property rights, the "air
rights" had been completely destroyed since it was prohibited from using those
rights. The Court rejected this argument, saying that it would not allow this
fragmenting of rights so that the rights when taken separately would be worth more
than the parcel as a whole.8" If this principle is applied to the mining industry,
and mineral owners are unable to successfully argue that their entire estate (the
minerals) has been taken, then there will, in all probability, be some use for any
land and the prohibitions of the Surface Mining Act will not result in a taking.
Preliminary indications are, however, that regulatory agencies are not applying
this principle to the mining industry. In perhaps the first widely reported
administrative application of the revised regulatory definition of valid existing rights,
the Deputy Under Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior deter" The United States Supreme Court has recognized as a protected interest an aesthetic interest.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). While most would consider this an insubstantial use of
coal bearing land, it is a legally protected, beneficial interest and could possibly work to prevent the
application of restrictions of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act from being an absolute
taking of property.
76 Agins

v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

" Presumably this would include purely aesthetic uses, protected in Sierra Club v. Morton.
" See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264; Andrus, 444 U.S. 51,
" Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
10 Id. at 130. See also Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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mined that the Otter Creek Coal Company had valid existing rights for land within
the Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia." In that situation, the company owned the minerals only. The Deputy concluded that, absent a favorable determination of the valid existing rights question, extraction of these minerals from
within the national forest would be prohibited. From this, the Deputy concluded
that such a prohibition would result in an absolute deprivation of all use of the
property. Thus, the mining company had valid existing rights at this site. While
this agency decision does not have the precedential weight of a court decision, it
is significant. Assuming that this decision survives the pending appeal,82 this
introduces into the law the possibility of a landowner having more rights because
the minerals have been severed from the surface than that owner would have if
the surface and minerals had remained united. Apparently in law, if not in
mathematics, addition by division is possible.
In short, a reading of this "no other use" test for determining when an
unconstitutional taking has occurred83 appears at first glance to result in the
impossibility of a finding that a company had valid existing rights. There will always
be some other use of land, even if it is not the most beneficial use. But the problems of severed mineral estates and uncertainty of just how much use must be left
after mining is prohibited in a location leave this area confused.
3. "Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations" Test
The Penn Central case also introduced what has come to be a new standard
for determining whether there has been a constitutional taking: "distinct investmentbacked expectations." While the Court may have intended this new phase as only
a refinement or a restatement of the line that must be crossed before there is a
taking," it has added a new dimension (and new confusion) to the law of taking.
That the Court intended this new standard as a gloss on Mahon is clear from
its citation of that case in support of its first use of that term. The Court did not,
however, clarify whether it intended the Penn Centraldecision to be a simple refinement of the "some remaining use" test first set forth in Mahon or as a useful
clarification of the misleading language of that case. Despite this lack of clarity,
it appears the Court was attempting a refinement of the "some remaining use"
theory because of the Court's enhanced interest in economic matters. Instead of
requiring that there be some use for the land 5 or that some value remain, the Court
began to review the property in question to determine if there would still be profit
to be made from it in the face of the governmental control or regulation.
Fed. Reg. 31,228 (1984) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491).
Potomac Chapterof SierraClub v. Reed, No. 84-822 (Interior Bd. of Land Appeals, fied 1984).
Such a taking would presumably require compensation.
See Mahon, 260 U.S. 393.
See Andrus, 444 U.S. 51.

SI 49
52
"
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The first indication of this expanded interest in economic matter appears in
the footnotes to Penn Central.86 There the Court indicated that the City of New
York had conceded in oral argument that if the property ceases to be "economically
viable" because of the restrictions placed upon it by the ordinance in question,
Penn Central would be entitled to compensation. While the Court did not specifically
say so, it appears to acquiesce in this interpretation. The expanded interest in
economic analysis appears again in Agins v. Tiburon. 7 There a developer objected
to a zoning ordinance which would have restricted development. While upholding
the ordinance, the Court announced as the standard for when a taking had occurred
as when the regulation "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."
If these words are taken literally then this may be an announcement that the Court
is willing to examine regulations with a view toward making a determination of
whether the landowner could still make a profit in spite of the questioned regulation.
The better interpretation of the new "distinct investment-backed expectations"
test, however, is one that focuses the inquiry upon what parties to a contract might
reasonably have expected. As commentators have noted, 8 the expectations of the
parties in Mahon would have been that strictly private relations would not be interfered with. But the parties could not expect to carry out their private contract
in such a way that would cause damage to members of the public not parties to
the contract.
This interpretation of the "distinct investment-backed expectation" standard
is supported by the United States Supreme Court's latest pronouncement on the
subject as well as language in the venerable and often cited Mahon. In Mahon,
the Court went to great pains to distinguish Plymouth Coal Company v.
Pennsylvania. 9 That case (decided just eight years before Mahon) involved a restriction on coal mining. This restriction survived a challenge because its purpose was
to promote safety of the miners. While the restriction on mining in Mahon was
offensive to the Court because it interfered with privately negotiated rights, the
restrictions in Plymouth Coal Company v. Pennsylvania were acceptable because
they were designed to protect members of the general public from the externalities
of private conduct.' 0 Although Justice Holmes did not use the term, it fits well
with a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" test for determining an
unconstitutional taking. One might reasonably expect that purely private relations
not affecting persons other than the parties should be allowed to continue without
public interference. On the other hand, one could not reasonably expect that relations between private individuals that have an adverse impact on the public at large
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36.
Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
" McGinley & Barrett, supra note 69.
'9 Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
" Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-15 (1922). Indeed, the authors know of no case in which a statute
or regulation which had as its purpose protection of the safety of the public being stricken as a taking
of property without just compensation.
"
"
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could proceed free of governmental control. This emphasis on the reasonable
expectations is the focus of the most recent Supreme Court ruling on this topic.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company, 91 the Court considered permissible uses
that could be made of data that was submitted to the United States Environmental
Protection Agency in support of an application for approval of a pesticide. 2 The
company contended that disclosure of the data to the public (which would include
its competitors) would amount to a taking for which it must be compensated. After
deciding that the data was, in fact, protectible property, the Court applied a
"reasonable investment-backed expectation" test to determine whether there had
been a taking.
The statute 93 at issue in Monsanto had been amended in 1978 authorizing
disclosure of data, even though it may result in disclosure of trade secrets. During
some time periods, the statute had made specific provisions for disclosure or nondisclosure of the data submitted. The Court made distinctions based upon the
language of the statute at the time the data was submitted. If the statute gave someone a "reasonable investment-backed expectation" of nondisclosure, then disclosure
might be a taking. If the statute gave no assurance, then there might not be a
taking. Although the language is the same as in Penn Central, the term "reasonable
investment-backed expectation" has taken on the additional meaning of not just
what a person could contemplate as a return on investment but what a person could
be expected to contemplate as a governmental reaction to the investment.
How the standard of "reasonable investment-backed expectation" would apply
to valid existing rights determinations is problematic. If the regulatory authority
attempts to apply economic analysis, the result would be an administrative nightmare.
To faithfully apply what the Supreme Court appears to be saying would require
analysis of economic data on profitability of land when faced with a negative determination of the valid existing rights issue. Such a determination would necessarily
involve some assumptions about the rate of return that companies are entitled to.
Presumably, any land which could not be used for surface mining could produce
either timber or agricultural products which would in most cases produce some
profit from the land. Presumably some profit, however small, is sufficient to meet
the test enunciated in Agins.9" If regulatory agencies attempt to define what they
will consider as a fair rate of return for valid existing rights purposes, they will
inevitably become ensnared in thorny policy disputes that they cannot possibly
resolve.
The easier (and theoretically sounder) application of a "reasonable investmentbacked expectation" test to valid existing rights determinations involves examinaRuckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S.Ct. 2862 (1984).
92Statutes prohibit sale of any pesticide not properly registered with the Environmental Protection Agency. 7 U.S.C. § 136G) (1982).
11Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
9' Agins, 447 U.S. 255.
"
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tion of the expectation which the owner of the mineral interest could reasonably
have had. At a minimum, this would require a negative valid existing rights determination for all companies which acquire the land in question after the effective
date of the Act.95 Under the rationale of Monsanto, companies' protected expectations are only those which the law would have protected at the time the expectation
arose. Thus, companies who acquired land or mineral rights after the effective date
of the Act did so knowing that the mining would be prohibited in certain areas.
In that situation they would have no "reasonable investment-backed expectation"
and, thus, no valid existing rights.
The broader application of this test to a valid existing rights determination
would restrict the situations where companies are found to have valid existing rights.
Companies owning coal reserves could legitimately expect that their contractual
relations with other private persons would remain intact. Companies could not
reasonably expect that the effects of the mining borne by persons not parties to
the contract would be immune from public control.
The Act itself is designed to deal with the externalities of mining. The Congressional findings9' speak of "causing erosion and landslides, contributing to floods,
polluting the water," and "creating hazards dangerous to life and property by
degrading the quality of life in local communities" as the evils of unregulated surface mining. While buyers of coal lands might reasonably expect to acquire the
right to do as they will on the land itself, they could not have expected to inflict
these damages upon persons not parties to the contract. The buyers never dealt
with those persons and never acquired any right to cause external damage.
Thus, very few mining companies would have valid existing rights under a
"reasonable investment-backed expectation." They could not expect to impose their
externalities with impunity. The distance and location limitations of the Act are
designed to ensure that the effects of the mining are confined to the mine site.97
Since one's ownership and use of property is always limited by potential harm to
others, one could reasonably expect limits such as the Act imposes and could rarely
have the expectations needed to support a finding of valid existing rights.
B. Effects of the Changes on Enforcement and Carrying Out of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act
The approach of the revised regulations basing valid existing rights determinations on constitutional taking considerations creates several problems. First, it virtually assures that the regulation of surface mining will no longer be nationally

"

August 3, 1977.

96 30

U.S.C. § 1201 (1982).
7 In its Environmental Impact Statement, the federal Office of Surface Mining refers to distance
limits as buffer zones. PROPOSED REVISIONS, VOL. I, supra note 41.
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uniform.9 8 This is true because each of the tests discussed above could be applied
to yield a different result. Because regulatory authorities in different states will
be applying these tests, this possibility of different results would almost certainly
result in similar situations being treated differently in different states.
Under the "noxious use" test, there is probably the least room for state-tostate variation, but the possibility still exists. Under that test, deference to the
legislative findings of public harm is paramount. 99 The prefatory language in the
statute "I and the legislative history'' both strongly suggest that surface mining
in many locations is a "noxious use" of the land. Given the importance of the
deference to legislative findings, it would be difficult for a regulatory authority
to conclude that surface mining is not a "noxious use" at the locations where it
is restricted. 0 2 With the authority to make these constitutional taking determinations given to regulatory authorities, however, such a conclusion is possible.
The "some remaining use" test for identifying a constitutional taking leaves
vast possibility for widely varying decisions in different states. This is true because
application of the test requires a regulatory authority to determine the quality of
a use that must remain to avoid an unconstitutional taking by application of the
statutory restrictions on the location of mines. One regulatory authority might conclude that any legally protected use of land was sufficient. Under such a rule, a
restriction on use of land for mining which left the landowner with only a recreational use of the land would not be a constitutional taking. 3 At the other end
of the scale, a regulatory authority could decide that a constitutional taking has
resulted unless there remains the highest and best use of the land after application
of the restrictions on mining."' There are indications that the federal Office of
Surface Mining has already moved toward this approach.' 5

11 National uniformity so as to prevent states from gaining a competitive advantage through lax

environmental standards was one of the stated goals of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (1982).
11See, e.g., Hadacheck, 239 U.S. 394; Mugler, 123 U.S. 623.
10030

U.S.C. § 1201.

101Regulation of Surface Mining: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the

House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, supra note 59.
02 Restrictions include within 300 feet of homes, within 10 feet of roads, in certain public lands
and so forth. See 30 U.S.C. § 1272.

10sA recreational use is a legally protected use of land. See supra note 75. If the only requirement
of the "some remaining use" test is that there be any use remaining, then a restriction on mining
which left the landowner with a recreational use of the land might well satisfy this test.
114 The authors know of no United States Supreme Court case which requires that, in order to
avoid an unconstitutional taking, the highest and best use of land remain after application of some
regulation. But, there is probably enough ambiguity in the decisions of the Court that some regulatory
authority could assume that this is the standard.
0I Conversation with Anna Norton, Solicitor for U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Pittsburgh, Pa (February

16, 1983).
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Variations among states in application of this test is almost assured in resolution of the problem of the mineral owner who owns only the minerals and nothing
else. As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court had indicated that one
cannot gain more rights by dividing interests in land.' 6 Yet in its first opportunity
to resolve this issue, the federal Office of Surface Mining decided that inability
to mine coal when one owned only the coal, because of a severence of the property,
amounted to a taking without compensation.'0 7 It is death to any thought of a
uniform program to leave this question to a multitude of regulatory authorities
all across the country. This is particularly true when the guidance those authorities
get from the Supreme Court and the Office of Surface Mining seems to be
contradictory.
Application of the "distinct investment-backed expectation" theory leaves even
more room for variation among states. A state could conclude, and find support
from the Supreme Court,' 0 that the theory required an economic analysis of the
issue. This would necessarily involve assumptions about appropriate rates of return
and other subjective criteria. It is unlikely that more than a few states would work
their way out of this regulatory thicket in the same way. It is even less likely that
enough states would resolve the question in the same way so as to result in a
nationally uniform program.
A state could also conclude that application of this test requires a distinction
between private rights of parties to an agreement and effects of mining on persons
not parties to the contract. Assuming that the regulatory authority can make such
a distinction, it would then have to decide whether the mining in the controversial
area affected such private or public rights and make its valid existing rights decisions accordingly. Another, and perhaps easier, way of phrasing this test is whether
the effects of the mining can all be limited to the mine site. The vagaries of such
a determination are such that there is little hope that a nationally uniform program
will result.
A state could also conclude that application of this test requires examination
of the reasonable, although subjective, expectations of the mineral owner.'0 9 Such
a test would require an examination of the state of the law at the time the mineral
owner acquired the interest. With so little guidance from the Supreme Court, it
is unlikely that various regulatory authorities would resolve these issues the same way.
In short, not even the United States Supreme Court can say with certitude what
is and is not a taking." ' To give that decision to different regulatory authorities

106

Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.

This decision was in the determination of valid existing rights in the Monongahela National
Forest. 49 Fed. Reg. 31,228 (1984) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491).
101 Agins, 447 U.S. 255; Penn Central, 438 U.S.
104.
Monsanto, 104 S.Ct. 2862.
See, e.g., Andrus, 444 U.S. 51.
"'
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in each of the twenty-four states where coal is found and hope that they make
sufficiently similar decisions to produce a uniform national program is more than
anyone could expect.
The second problem with the approach taken by the revised regulations is that
it gives responsibility for making constitutional determinations to administrators
who are not equipped to make them. In some situations, it may not even be legal
for state agencies to make constitutional determinations."' Even where

administrators have the bare legal authority to make these determinations, they
do not have the expertise. It is folly to take legal questions which the United States
Supreme Court has difficulty answering" 2 and leave their resolution to regulators,
who by training and inclination know engineering, agriculture, and forestry. " '

The third, and most serious, problem with the revised regulations is that they
greatly expand the areas where surface mining potentially may be allowed. Exactly
how great the expansion will be is the subject of some controversy. No matter its
size, the acreage which will be affected is very important because it is the acreage
closest to people's homes, churches, schools, and highways. The revised regulations
achieve this expansion by at least raising the possibility that mining could be conducted in areas where it would otherwise be prohibited.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As with all legislation, the Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act is a
compromise. At various times Congress was given the option of banning surface
mining, taking no federal action, or doing something between these extremes. Congress chose the option of allowing surface mining under defined conditions in all
but a few areas, such as within 300 feet of homes. So as to prevent undue hardship
on coal operations which would be affected by the Act, Congress exempted from
4
these limitations "existing operations" and those with valid existing rights.' '
The original regulations were consistent with the legislative scheme. The goal
was to prohibit mining in certain limited locations. To work toward that goal, the
regulations allowed anyone who was mining, or who had applied for a permit to
mine at the time of the Act, to continue. Since no mine lasts forever, these mines
which had begun or were about to begin in 1977 would eventually exhaust their
coal reserves and close. If no new mine was allowed to open in the listed areas,
the Congressional goal of not having mining in certain designated areas could be
achieved without taking the harsh step of requiring an operating mine to shut down.
I The regulatory authority in Kentucky, for example, is prohibited from considering the validity
of a property right. During consideration of proposed rule changes, Kentucky took the position that
it could not administer the proposed rules because of this conflict with state law. Letter from Elmore
Grim to James Harris, Director, Office of Surface Mining (February 28, 1983).
See, e.g., Andrus, 444 U.S. 51.
In West Virginia a background in these fields is mandatory. W. VA. CODE § 20-6-4 (1984).
"'
114 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (1982).
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The new regulations change all that. Although still subject to the uncertainty
of constitutional litigation discussed above, it is entirely possible under the new
regulations for an operator to mine a tract within a prohibited area even though,
prior to implementation of the Act, he had never considered mining in that area.
Under the revised regulations, a mining company could buy mineral rights within
300 feet of a house today, tomorrow, or any time in the future and argue that
the government's refusal to allow it to mine that tract deprived it of its property.
While the confusion in the law of constitutional taking makes the outcome a bit
uncertain, the company has at least some possibility of success with such an
argument."s
This result could never have occurred under the previous regulations. Under
those regulations, only those who were mining or who had applied for a permit
could have any hope of being allowed to continue to mine within the prohibited
areas.
Thus, the new regulations have dramatically changed the Act. By regulation,
the United States Department of the Interior has changed a Congressional program
of prohibiting mining within certain locations. It has gone from a scheme in which
mining in these prohibited areas would die a relatively painless death by attrition
to a scheme in which the constitutional determinations of administrators may allow
it to live forever.

Such a result would probably not be justified, particularly in light of the emphasis upon the
state of the regulatory law at the time the property interest was acquired as discussed in Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co. But considering the chronic confusion in the law of constitutional takings, such a
result is still possible.
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